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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-PUBLIC UTILITY HOLDING COMPANY Acr--:
VALIDITY OF HOLDING COMPANY "DEATH SENTENCE" CLAUSE-Petitioner
was the topmost holding company in a public utility holding company system
which included eighty subsidiaries and served three million customers in seventeen states. By provision of section I I (b) (I) of the Public Utility Holding
Company Act of 1935,1 the Securities and Exchange Commission was empowered to limit the operations of a holding company registered with it under
the act to "a single integrated public utility system." Acting under this authority,

1

49 Stat.' L. 803,. (1935), 15 U.S.C. (1940) §§ 79a.et seq.
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the commission ordered petitioner, a registered company, to divest itself of all its
subsidiary holdings excepting certain interests regarded by the commission as a
single integrated system within the. meaning of the act.2 In seeking to have the
order of the commission set aside, petitioner contended that the measures provided by section I I (b) (I) were without the power of Congress under the commerce clause of the Constitution and violated due process secured by the Fifth
Amendment. Held, the challenged measures are constitutional. The North
American Compa1:-y v. Securities and Exchange Commission, (U.S. 1946) 8
66 S. Ct. 785.
The signi:fican~ of the decision in the principal case is disclosed not _so much
in the constitutional interpretations it announces as in the nature of the legislation
it upholds. The act was designed to cure :five broad categories of abuses "injurious to investors, consumers• and the general public" 4 and to that end imposes a clos~ system of regulation on holding companies registered with the enforcing commission with respect to the issuing of securities, the acquisition of
assets or securities, the reorganization or dissolution of the companies themselves [ section I I (b)], the conduct of various :financial transactions and the perforrµance of various contract&. 5 The key to the constitutional basis of this broad
scheme of regulation is found in the provisions for registration with the commission; _for while registration is in terms permissive,6 unnegistered· companies are
forbidden to u&e the mails 'or any of the instrumentalities of commerce to distribute power or gas, to negotiate contracts with other utility or holding compapies or to perform such contracts, to sell or acquire securities, or to engage in
any business generally.7 It is thus apparent that the legislation proceeds upon the
assumption that the use of the mails or the channels of commerce for business purposes may be conditioned upon submission to regulation undefined in extent. 8
1
•

2 Holding Company Act Release No. 3405 (April 12, 1942), CCH FED SECURITIES LAw SEiv., U75,271. The system retained by petitioner under the commission's
order consisted principally of the Union Electric Co. of Missouri and certain of its
subsidiaries.
8 The circuit court of appeals in its decision below had upheld the legislation.
North American Company v. Securities and Exchange Commission, (C.C.A. 2d, 1943)
133 F. (2d) 148. Other lower court decisions sustaining § u(b)(1) or the related
provisions of§ u(b)(2) are Com'monwealth & Southern Corp. v. Securities and Exchange Comm., (C.C.A. 3d, 1943) 134 F. (2d) 747; United Gas Improvement Co.
v. Securities and Exchange Comm., (C.C.A. 3d., 1943) 138 F. (2d) 1010; American
Power and Light Co. v'. Securities and Exchange Comm., (C.C.A. 1st, 1944) 141 F.
(2d) 606.
I
4 49 Stat. L. 803, § 1(c) (1935), 15 U.S.C. (1940) §§ 79a. The five categories appear in § l (b) and detail such matters as the issuance of securities upon un·sound values, over-capitalization, excessive charges to subsidiacies for various services,
the employment of accounting systems and financial policies which hamper state regulation, the growth of holding company systems unrelated to business economies, and inefficiency and inadequacy of service.
5 The more important regulatory provisions are contained in §§ 6' to 13 inclusive.
6 49 Stat. L. 803, § 5 (1935), 15 U.S.C. (1940) §§ 79a et seq. By the language of this section any holding company "may" registe; with the commission.
7 Id. § 4(a).
8 It should be recognized at this point that while the power of Congress over commerce arises from Art._ 1, Sec. 8, Cl. 3 of the Constitution, its power over the mails is
implied from the au_thority to establish post offices and roads contained in Art. 1, Sec. 8,
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In this the Holding Company Act differs materially from most legislation regulating economic activity previously held valid under the commerce clause. Most
of such legislation has gone upon the ,theory that the ~onditions or practices over
which control was sought burdened ?r obstructed commerce, 9 and in upholding
it the Court has felt required to find that there was a reasonable basis for the
belief that the conditions or practices in question in each instance did in fact affect
commerce; and it has then proceeded to justify federal control on the basis that
Congress is authorized to reach such matters as a function of its power under
the.commerce clause "to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed." 10 While language reminiscent of the earlier cases is found in the present decision, it is clear that the Court sustains the act on principles as simple as
the act intends. 11 The decision establishes the interstate character of petitioner's
business by the control it exerted over its subsidiaries, by its use of the mails and
the instrumentalities of commerce to effect this control, and by the fact that several of its immediate subsidiaries were operating utilities in interstate commerce.1 ll
Without further argument at this point, the Court concludes that the petitioner
" . . . is thus subject to appropriate regulatory measures adopted by Congress
under its commerce power." 18 The company's stock holdings are readily identified as the vital element in its operations and the divestment order therefore justi-

a

Cl. 7. If there is difference in the reach of these powers it is not noticed in the
principal case, where the issue is treated as a matter of the commerce power. In this
connection, see note I 9, infra.
9 The "burden and obstruct" terminology is found in the National Labor Relations
Act, 49 Stat. L. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. (1940) §§ 151 et seq. and in the Agricultural
Adjustment Act, 52 Stat. L. 31 (1938), 35 U.S.C. (1940) §§ 1281 et seq., for example. The Fair Labor Standards Act, 52 Stat. L. 1060 (1938), 29 U.S.C. (1940)
§§ 201 et seq., though containing the same language, is in part similar to the present
legislation and is treated specially below in the text. The Securities Exchange.Act, 48
Stat. L. 881 (1934), 15 U.S.C. (1940) §§ 78 et seq. employs (§ 5) as the basis for
control a registration requirement similar to that provided in §§ 4 and 5 of the Holding Company Act, but it is so much narrower in scope as not to constitute economic
legislation of the same class as the other statutes under consideration.
10 Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. (22 U.S.) I at 196 (1824). The familiar quotation from Chief Justice Marshall is used by the Court in the principal case. For ca~es
illustrating this approach: Board of Trade of City of Chicago v. Olsen, 262 U.S. I at
40, 43 S. Ct. 470 (1923); National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 at 37, 57 S. Ct. 615 (1936); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S.
I I I at 125, 63 S. Ct. 82 (1942).
11 Lower court decisions sustaining the provisions of § I I (b) have sometimes
resorted to the more familiar terminology to support their determinations. See for
example Commonwealth & Southern Corp. v. Securities and Exchange Commission,
(C.C.A. 3d, 1943) 134 F. (2d) 747 at 752. A principal cause of this difficulty is the
wording of § I ( c) of the act where it is stated that the purpose of the legislation is to
meet the problems connected with holding companies "which are engaged in interstate commerce or in activities which affect or burden interstate commerce." 49 Stat. L.
803, § 1(c) (1935), 15 U.S.C. (1940) §§ 79a et seq. But since the scope of the
act is limited with such 'precision by the registration provisions, §§4 and 5, to the companies that actually employ the mails or the means of interstate commerce, the second
clause above quoted would seem to be deprived of any effect.
12 Principal case at 790, 791.
'
' 18 Principal case at 792.
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fied as an appropriate means of effecting the Congressional purpose. The Court
counters the charge that the divestment order violated due process by depriving
holding company investors of the valuable right ' to pool their investments by
declaring that considerations of private interest are of no avail where Congress
has determined a conflicting public interest to be paramount; but the holding
adds that under the controlling provisions of the act it was not necessary to assume that private investors would suffer material losses in the divestment proced1,1re.14 The Court's acquiescence in tlJ.e regulative scheme set up by the act
necessarily implies that Congress may condition the right to use commerce and
the mails upon submission to whatever i:egulation deems necessary to impose.
The constitutional theory for such a power is suggested in those cases which
hold that Congress may prevent commerce and the mails from being employed
to effect or spread harmful social conditions,15 and the Court in the principal
case speaks largely in those terms, citing Brooks v. United States 16 as representative of- that line of authority. 17 In this respect the controlling issue in the
principal case was decided;in Electric Bo~/ & Share Co. v. Securities and Exchange Commission 18 where the specific sections conditioning the use of the
mails and the instrumentalities of commerce upon registration with the commission were upheld. 19 At that time the Court expressly deferred judgm~nt on the
validity of other regulative sections of the act. 20 The present decision, however,

it

',

14 Principal case at 798. Petitioner argued that a forced sale of securities might impose severe losses on the holders; but the Court answered that much of the divestment
might be accomplished by the exchange of securities rather than by sale and pointed out
further that under the provisions of the act petitioner was allowed a year, and upon
special showing two years, in which to complete the operation, thus allowing a gradual
disposition of securities.
15 Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321, 23 S. Ct. 321 (1903); Public Clearing
House v. Coyne, 194 U.S. 497, 24 S. Ct. 789 (1,904); Hipolite Egg Co. v. United
·states, 220 U.S. 45, 31 S. Ct. 364 (1911); Reid v. Colorado, 187 U.S. 137, 23 S. Ct.
92 (1902); Hoke v. United-States, 227 U.S. 308, 33 S. Ct. 281 (1913); Brooks v.
United States, 267 U.S. 432, 45 S. Ct. 345 (1925).
16 267 u~s. 432, 45 S. Ct. 345 (1925). Congress had found, states the decision
in the principal case, that holding company practices were "polluting" the channels of
interstate commerce. Principal case at 797.
17 The suggestion is made in Lesser, "Constitutional Powers of the Securities and
Exchange Commission over Public Utility Holding Companies," 8 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. I I 28 at Il4l ( I 940), that the power of Congress to impose the regulations of
the Holding Company Act could derive from its authority to charter corporations to
engage in interstate commerce and thus to permit corporations not chartered by it to
engage in _interstate commerce on the terms it prescribes.
18 303 U.S. 419,' 58 S. Ct. 678 (1938).
.
19 The commerce and postal powers are separately considered in this decision as
constitutional basis for the registration sections with the implication that the postal
power is the more limited in the support i't affords legislative regulation though adequate for the provisions in question. Electric Bond & Share Co. v. Securities and Ex-,
change Commission, 303 U.S. 419 at 442, 58 S. Ct. 678 (1938). For a discussion of
the postal power in this connection, see "The Expanding Postal Power," 38 CoL. L.
REv.' 474 (1938), where the opinion is expressed that the Holding Company Act is
grounded more particularly on the commerce- power.
20 Electric Bond & Share Co. v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 303 U.S.
419 at 439, 58 S. Ct. 678 (1938). The argument of counsel in this case that a decision
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validates the most far-reaching regulative measures and establishes the presumption that the entire act is constitutional. 21 The decision most nearly a precedent
for the principal case is United States v. Darby.22 In that case the Court sustained a provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act 23 which banned the shipment in commerce of goods produced under substandard labor conditions as defined by other section,s of that act, on the authority of the Brooks ·v. United
States line of decisions, notwithstanding the fact that the prohibition was designed
to effect a local regulation of the wages and hours of labor.u In addition, however, the Court upheld the power of Congress to prescribe the wages and hours
of labor in production for interstate commerce independently of the prohibition
provision. 25 The distinction to be noted: between the two cases is that the Darby
decision finds the authority in the commerce clause to close the channels of commerce to products which would necessarily, in the economic theory of the legislation, spread the undesirable conditions Congress seeks to eliminate; while the
principal case establishes the power to close the mails and channels of commerce
to holding companies for the conduct of business of any description, regardless of
the purpose or effect of particular transactions, to the end of compelling the
companies to submit to general federal conl:rol. In fortifying its conclusion,
the Court cites the more important cases defining the commerce' power, 2 G particularly those which indicate the extent to which control of local activities is
upholding the validity of the registration sections necessjlrily subjected the company to
the regulative provisions of the act was disallowed by the Court on the ground that the
decree then under review expressly reserved the right to the appellant to challenge the
constitutionality of other portions of the act. For the Court in the principal case, the
registration sections seem to determine the legality of the regulative provisions as a
matter of course. By the operation of § 4{a) " ..• Congress has effectively applied
Sec. I I (b) {1) to those holding companies that are in fact in the stream of interstate
activity and that affect commerce in more states than one . . . Section I 1 (b) ( 1) is
thus clearly and unmistakably applicable to companies engaged in interstate commerce."
Principal case at 793. In Lesser, "Constitutional Powers of the Security and Exchange
Commission over Public Utility Holding Companies," 8 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1128 at
II 3 5 ( I 940), the writer, supervising attorney for the commission, states that the holding in the Electric Bond and Share case " ..• must rest upon the premise that Congress
has the power to prohibit the use of the mails or the channels of interstate commerce
in connection with such matters as Congress might deem necessary for the protection of
the people of the United States..•."
21 There has been some suggestion that the validity of § II (b){2), the corporate
simplification provisions of the act, must rest on a different constitutional basis than
§ II (b )(I). Manoff, "Constitutionality of the Simplification and Voting Power Provisions of the Holding Company Act," 16 TEMPLE L. Q. 32 (1941). This distinction has not concerned the courts. See, for example, American Power and Light Company v. Securities and Exchange Commission, (C.C.A. 1st, 1944) 141 F. {2d) 606,
where the circuit court's decision in the principal case upholding the validity of
§ I I {b) (I) is cited as authority for the validity of § I I (b) ( 2). This view is impliedly
given the sanction of the Supreme Court in the principal case (at 796).
22 312 U.S. 100, 61 S. Ct. 451 (1941).23 52 Stat. L. 1060 at 1068, § 15{a){1) (1935), 29 U.S.C. (1940) § 215.
u United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 at 113, 61 S. Ct. 451 (1941).
25 ld. at 122. The section here involved is§ 15{a){2), 52 Stat. L. 1060 at 1068
(1935), 29 U.S.C. (1940) § 215(a){2).
26 The cases cited in note 9, supra, among others.
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authorized in effectuating the policy of Congress respecting commerce; and
the Northern Securities case is invoked as precedent for the, particular measure
involved i!} the divestment proceeding. 27 But resort to these authorities does not
avoid the fact that the Court here bases the _validity of extensive regulation on
the sole ground that the business to be regulated is conducted by the use of the
mails and the instrumentalities of commerce. It is fair to conclude that the
case considered along with the regulative scheme it upholds states a constitutional rationale for federal supervision of economic activities which, if no more
penetrating than hitherto realized in particular cases, may 'proceed on a broader
front.
John A. Huston

27 Northern Securities Co. v. United States, ICJ3 U.S. 197, 24 S. Ct. 436 (1904).
Similar cases under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act are also cited.

